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Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350825
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867
higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761639
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015190643
This paper provides a formal analysis on the investment coordination problem in a vertically separated electricity … decisions of network and power plants need to be coordinated. In unbundled markets, firm-internal coordination no longer applies …. We develop a formal approach to examine whether sim- ple information exchange ("cheap talk") could restore coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010421957
type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players' types are … different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011533759
range of prior probability of the High-Type. This equilibrium has a desirable type-coordination property: it fully … coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilbrium when the players' types are different. Type-coordination is also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818179
coordination property. Such coordination can also be obtained as a partially revealing cheap talk equilibrium. These outcomes can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818189