We consider three new axioms for surplus sharing problems. The first is strong monotonicity which says that workers should be rewarded for increases in productivity and the second says that productive workers should receive some compensation. The third requires that the surplus sharing rule...

In this paper we study consistency in the context of additive cost sharing mechanisms. We contrast an extremely weak notion of consistency with the standard definition, which we denote strong consistency. First we show that many well known CSMs are consistent in both senses: Aumann-Shapley,...

We provide several new characterizations of well known cost sharing methods (CSMs) as maxima of linear (or convex) functionals. For the Shapley-Shubik method the characterization has an interpretation in terms of randomly ordered agents choosing their most preferred CSM, while the...

In this paper we develop a unified framework for the study of additive cost sharing methods. We show that any additive cost sharing method satisfying the dummy axiom can be generated by a (possibly infinite) convex combination of path generated methods. We also show that the set of scale...

We consider three new axioms for surplus sharing problems. The first is strong monotonicity which says that workers should be rewarded for increases in productivity and the second says that productive workers should receive some compensation. The third requires that the surplus sharing rule...