This paper considers allocation rules. First, we demonstrate that costs allocated by the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming. Second, from the linear programming...

When losses caused by one agent onto another triggers losses to a third, "victim" turns into "injurer" in the chain's subsequent steps. Should agents be responsible for the direct loss they cause or also bear some of the indirect losses they trigger? Through an axiomatic approach, we...

We examine a chain of sequential losses: an agent causes a loss to another, which triggers a loss to a third, and so forth. Our objective is to redistribute the losses fairly, taking into account that the chain turns "victim" to "injurer" in its subsequent step. This opens up for many...

In this paper we consider a family of cost allocation rules for which agents pay a share of their incremental cost as well as of any ‘debt’ from prior agents. This family encompasses the Bird rule and the free riding rule (where terminal agents pay everything) as the two extreme cases. By...

We consider a cost sharing problem among agents on a line. The problem is closely related to the classic airport game, but in our model agents are characterized by their location, rather than their needed runway length. We characterize a family of cost allocation rules in which agents pay a...