We investigate how borrowers' corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with...

Given that political uncertainty greatly impacts firm level investment decisions, this paper examines whether and how political uncertainty influences a firm's cost of bank loans. We create a novel measurement of individual firm's exposure to political uncertainty and find that fluctuations in...

This study investigates whether CEO perquisite of borrowing firms plays any significant role, both in terms of price and non-price settings, in financial contracts and reveals that lending banks demand significantly higher return (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with...

Formal enforcement actions issued against banks for violations of laws and regulations related to safety and soundness can theoretically have both positive and negative effects on the terms of lending. Using data on such enforcement actions issued against U.S. banks, we show that they have a...

We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with higher levels of social capital incur lower bank loan spreads. This finding is robust to using organ donation as an alternative social-capital measure and incremental to the effects of religiosity, corporate social responsibility, and tax...

We study how firms' ownership structure affects the cost of debt using evidence from Chinese corporate bond market. Our result shows state, institutional, and foreign ownership all help to reduce firms' cost of debt. The effect of state ownership is more pronounced if the issuer is headquartered...

This paper investigates the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable and syndicated loans...