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A firm actively manages its rival's beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on the size of its process innovation. The firm's disclosure strategy results from the trade-off between two effects on product market incentives. First, the firm's competitor learns that the firm is efficient,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261185
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor´s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348185
-) Parameter zu erlangen und diese offen zu legen. Da die Bemühungen der Firmen, Informationen zu erlangen, auch fehlschlagen … können, können sie ungünstige Informationen glaubwürdig unterschlagen und günstige offen legen. In diesem Beitrag werden die … Anreize für eine derartige teilweise Offenlegungsstrategie, sowie die resultierenden Gewinne und die soziale Wohlfahrt mit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278130
A firm actively manages its rival’s beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on the size of its process innovation. The firm’s disclosure strategy results from the trade-off between two effects on product market incentives. First, the firm’s competitor learns that the firm is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406251
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where firms may fail to receive information, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor’s product-market strategy....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892064
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where firms may fail to receive information, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitor's product-market strategy....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905833
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301237