In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions. It is shown that an agreement between p arties on the bargaining agenda may endogenously emerge only on the Efficient Bargaining arrangement, provided that union’s power is not too high.

In this paper we investigate the effects of two popular labour market institutions – namely, Monopoly Union (MU) and Efficient Bargaining (EB) – in a Cournot duopoly, in particular as regards the issue of the bargaining agenda. We show that, while when EB and Right-to- Manage arrangements...

In this paper we investigate the effects of two popular labour market institutions – namely, Monopoly Union and Efficient Bargaining – on market and welfare outcomes in a Cournot duopoly. We show that depending on values of the union power, the Monopoly Union institution may be preferred by...

We consider a unionised duopoly with efficient bargaining at the firm level (i.e. negotiations both on wage and employment). We show that if the target of unions is the total wage bill, then, as expected, consumer surplus and social welfare are the same of when the labour market is...

This paper studies equilibrium incentive contracts in a Cournot duopoly, in which institutional arrangements constrain firms to pay (risk-neutral) workers a given salary. In this context, performance-related-pay (PRP) and relative performance evaluation (RPE) are compared in terms of resulting...