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We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471635
The paper discusses several issues related to how monetary policy should be conducted in an era of price stability. Low inflation (with base drift in the price level) and price-level stability (without such base drift) are compared, and a suitable loss function (corresponding to flexible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471258
Inflation target regimes (like those of New Zealand, Canada, U.K., Sweden and Finland) are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit output/unemployment targets. Without output-unemployment persistence delegation of monetary policy to a discretionary instrument-independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473624
The paper gives a brief account of the Swedish experience of an inflation target in a floating exchange rate regime; identifies, documents and discusses the current problems in Swedish monetary policy and their origins; considers what can be done to remedy the problems; and draws some general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473913
A simple test of inflation target credibility is constructed by subtracting the maximum and minimum inflation rates consistent with the inflation targets from the yields to maturity on nominal bonds. This results in a target-consistent range of real yields on nominal bonds. If expected real...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474336
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000986225
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000659392
We examine a central bank's endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency, under both commitment and discretion. Under commitment, we find that the deliberate choice of sloppy control is far less likely under a standard central-bank loss function than reported for a less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157375
We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137302