We develop a model that shows that inefficient legal protections, disproportionately increase financial restrictions for debtors that have less wealth. Due to fixed monitoring costs in equilibrium banks will not monitor small firms and therefore these firms will adopt risky technologies that...

We suggest that foreign banks may represent a trade-off for their developing country hosts. A portfolio model is developed to show that a more diversified international bank may be one of lower, overall risk and less susceptible to funding shocks but may react more to shocks that affect expected...

This paper studies the relationship between creditor protection and credit volatility. During the negative phase of the business cycle, credit contracts more in countries with poor creditor protection. For similar shocks to business conditions, credit is more volatile in countries where...

This paper develops a model showing that inefficient legal protections disproportionately increase financial restrictions for creditors that have less wealth. Due to fixed monitoring costs in equilibrium, banks will not monitor small firms, and therefore these firms will adopt risky technologies...

We develop a model in which the elasticity of credit to exogenous shocks depends on creditor rights regulations. We show that an increase in creditor protection reduces the elasticity of credit supply to exogenous shocks, and hence the amplitude of the credit cycle. Using an extended set of a...