The paper provides an overview of several selected topics dealing with application of agency theory to the credit contracts. The costly state verification and costly punishment models of optimal debt contracts are introduced and compared with respect to their performance in the situation...

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her cost of bankruptcy, and a lender may use random contracts to screen different...

This paper develops an adverse selection model which uncovers two mechanisms whereby Grameen-style peer grouping systems can trigger lower interest rates. In one extreme scenario, where participant borrowers do not have prior information about the type of their peers, lower interest rate are...

This paper extends Ghatak (1999)'s base model of group lending with asymmetric information by allowing individuals to differ both in their exogenous risk type and in their endogenous effort level. We find that joint liability leads to positive assortative matching in both a non-cooperative and a...

The purpose of this paper is to derive a model for calculation of maturities and volumes of repayments that a bank may expect from nonretail nonperforming loans (hereafter NPLs). Expected inflows from nonretail NPLs follow a probability distribution, defined by size and timing of historic...

Against the backdrop of a high stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) in several European countries, this paper investigates the role of NPLs for lending rates charged for newly granted loans in the euro area. More precisely, it looks for an effect that extends beyond losses caused by that stock...

Securitized loans have lower lead bank shares but larger shares held by non-CLO institutional investors than non-securitized loans. The result can largely be explained by their degree of information asymmetry and credit risk. We find that lead banks increase their holdings after a...