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This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312010
This paper shows that increasing the sanction on collective crime may increase its prevalence. This situation arises when individuals can commit crimes both individually and as part of a collective. Our result is based on an interdependence between detection probabilities where detection of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471594
The inspection game as formulated by Tsebelis (Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 83:77–91, 1989) has the counterintuitive implication that crime is unaffected by the magnitude of the penalty. This paper demonstrates that to attain this outcome, it is necessary to assume independence of enforcer and offender...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471770
This paper analyzes a contest in which defenders move first, have private information about the value of the objects they are trying to protect, and determine the observability of their defense efforts. The equilibrium consistent with the intuitive criterion depends on the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326833
This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956713
This paper analyzes a contest in which defenders move first, have private information about the value of the objects they are trying to protect, and determine the observability of their defense efforts. The equilibrium consistent with the intuitive criterion depends on the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956781
Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for offenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930727