Law enforcement is decentralized. It is so despite documented interjurisdictional externalities which would justify its centralization. To explain this fact, we construct a political economy model of law enforcement. Under decentralization, law enforcement in each region is in accord with the...

This paper studies interjurisdictional competition in the fight against crime and its impact on occupational choice and the allocation of capital. In a world where capital is mobile, jurisdictions are inhabited by individuals who choose to become workers or criminals. Because the return of the...

In the last thirty years, economists have been applying their tools and methods to the study of crime deterrence. In this paper, we review their most important contributions. <P> Depuis une trentaine d'années, les économistes ont appliqué leurs outils et leurs méthodes au problème de la...</p>

This paper studies interjurisdictional competition in the fight against crime and its impact on occupational choice and the allocation of capital. In a world where capital is mobile, jurisdictions are inhabited by individuals who choose to become workers or criminals. Because the return of the...

We explore the implications of endogenous credit market imperfections for the relationship between property crime and the process of economic development. In the initial stages of development, property crime rises as the opportunities to gain from illegal activities expand. In later stages,...

A framework is developed in which the formation of gangs-the criminal market structure-is endogenous. As in standard models of crime, under a given gang structure, an increase in deterrence reduces criminal output. However, under identifiable circumstances, an increase in deterrence can lead to...