We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

This chapter reviews economic analyses of privacy. We begin by scrutinizing the "free market" critique of privacy regulation. Welfare may be non-monotone in the quantity of information, hence there may be excessive incentive to collect information. This result applies to both non-productive and...

Problem definition: We study customer-centric privacy management in service systems and explore the consequences of extended control over personal information by customers in such systems.Methodology: We adopt a stylized queueing model to capture a service environment that features a service...

Two duopolists compete in price on the market for a homogeneous product. They can ‘profile’ consumers, i.e., identify their valuations with some probability. If both firms can profile consumers but with different abilities, then they achieve positive expected profits at equilibrium. This...

This paper examines how data-driven personalized decisions can be made while preserving consumer privacy. Our setting is one in which the firm chooses a personalized price based on each new customer's vector of individual features; the true set of individual demand-generating parameters is...

A monopolist can use a 'tracking' technology that allows it to identify a consumer's willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a 'hiding' technology. We show in this note that consumers are collectively better off when this hiding technology is not...

This article introduces a transaction cost economic framework for interpreting the roles consumers play in social networking services (“SNSs”). It explains why the exchange between consumers and SNSs is not simple and discrete, but rather a continuous transaction with atypical attributes....

Payment systems that allow people to pay using their mobile phones are promised to reduce transaction fees, increase convenience, and enhance payment security. New mobile payment systems also are likely to make it easier for businesses to identify consumers, to collect more information about...

Media reports teem with stories of young people posting salacious photos online, writing about alcohol-fueled misdeeds on social networking sites, and publicizing other ill-considered escapades that may haunt them in the future. These anecdotes are interpreted as representing a generation-wide...