In decision problems with absentmindedness the decision maker may manifest time-inconsistent choices in spite of unaltered preferences. In this paper we argue that this can be the case whenever the decision makeris reasoning is not appropriately modeled. More in particular, it is shown that the...

We conducted a set of experiments to compare the effect of ambiguity in single person decisions and games. Our results suggest that ambiguity has a bigger impact in games than in ball and urn problems. We find that ambiguity has the opposite effect in games of strategic substitutes and...

For choice with deterministic consequences, the standard rationality hypothesis is ordinality, i.e., maximization of a weak preference ordering. For choice under risk (resp. uncertainty), preferences are assumed to be represented by the objectively (resp. subjectively) expected value of a von...

The paper proposes a framework to extend regret theory to dynamic contexts. The key idea is to conceive of a dynamic decision problem with regret as an intra-personal game in which the agent forms conjectures about the behaviour of the various counterfactual selves that he could have been. We...

If a decision maker, in a world of uncertainty a la Anscombe and Aumann (1963), can choose acts according to some objective probability distribution (by throwing dice for instance) from any given set of acts, then there is no set of acts that allows an experimenter to test more than the Axiom of...

Several models of probabilistic choice under uncertainty allow for deterministic choice if one act state-wise dominates the other. Such models have a natural application in game theory where probabilistic choice corresponds to mixed strategies, deterministic choice — to pure strategies and...

This paper models a near-rational agent who chooses from a set of feasible alternatives, subject to a cost function for precise decision-making. Unlike previous papers in the "control costs" tradition, here the cost of decisions is explicitly interpreted in terms of time. That is, by choosing...

We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent's preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by alpha-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation...