In real life strategic interactions decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present here a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled...

Three well‐known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit...

We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms - the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms - in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that - in line with the theory -...

We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms—the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms—in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that—in line with the...