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Born of a belief that economic insights should not require much mathematical sophistication, this book proposes novel and parsimonious methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling, without complex mathematics. Economics has made great strides over the past several...
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A decision-maker acquires payoff-relevant information until she reaches her storing capacity, at which point she either terminates the decision-making and chooses an action, or discards some information. By conditioning the probability of termination on the information collected, she controls...
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We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...
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We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663632
We present a social learning experiment in which subjects predict the value of a good in sequence. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessors' prediction; second, after he also observes a private signal. Our main result is that subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625815
We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("prior belief"), after he observes his predecessors' action; second ("posterior belief"), after he...
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