A decision maker (DM) is asked to make choices from a set of acts, which entail both risk and uncertainty in the sense of knight (1921). Extending Raiffa's (1961) argument I show that, provided the DM can choose acts objectively randomly (by flipping her own fair coin, for instance), provided...

Recently, the positive theory of rational choice has come under attack from experimental psychologists and economists. Their experimental results, gathered together under the banner of behavioral analysis, show that the maximizing model of rational choice often does not provide a very accurate...

This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...

The random utility model (RUM, McFadden and Richter (1990)) has been the standard tool to describe the behavior of a population of decision makers. RUM assumes that decision makers behave as if they maximize a rational preference over a choice set. This assumption may fail when consideration of...

This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...

A growing literature reports the conclusions that: (a) expected utility theory does not provide a plausible theory of risk aversion for both small-stakes and large-stakes gambles; and (b) this decision theory should be replaced with an alternative theory characterized by loss aversion. This...

A statistical decision rule is a mapping from data to actions induced by statistical inference on the data. We characterize these rules for data that are chosen strategically in persuasion environments. A designer wishes to persuade a decision maker (DM) to take a particular action and decides...

We propose and axiomatize a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call hope-and-prepare preferences. An act is considered more desirable than another when, and only when, both an optimistic evaluation, computed as the welfare level attained in a best-case scenario, and...

Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that...