We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM's...

We show how incorporating Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler's (2010) notion of objective rationality into the α-MEU model of choice under ambiguity (Hurwicz, 1951) can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has...

Under dynamic random utility, an agent (or population of agents) solves a dynamic decision problem subject to evolving private information. We analyze the fully general and non-parametric model, axiomatically characterizing the implied dynamic stochastic choice behavior. A key new feature...

We provide an axiomatic analysis of dynamic random utility, characterizing the stochastic choice behavior of agents who solve dynamic decision problems by maximizing some stochastic process (U_t) of utilities. We show first that even when (U_t) is arbitrary, dynamic random utility imposes new...