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A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using...
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uncertainty a bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given her bid is an …
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This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design problems. This notion is quantifiable, allowing us to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241735
This note considers the problem of a principal (she) who faces a privately informed agent (he) and only knows one moment of the distribution from which his types are drawn. Payoffs are non-linear in the allocation and the principal maximizes her worst-case expected profits. We recast the robust...
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We study a two-stage R&D project with an abandonment option. Two types of uncertainty influence the decision to start R …&D. Demand uncertainty is modelled as a lottery between a proportional increase and decrease in demand. Technical uncertainty is … modelled as a lottery between a decrease and increase in the cost to continue R&D. We relate differences in uncertainty to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159738