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Bose, Subir; Ozdenoren, Emre; Pape, Andreas D. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 4, pp. 411-438

A crucial assumption in the optimal auction literature is that each bidder's valuation is known to be drawn from a unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702781

Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions

Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene - 2018

Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their competitors' valuations is restricted to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946017

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015

We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549

The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065831

The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047263

Coalition-proof Ambiguous Mechanism

Guo, Huiyi - 2021

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous mechanisms are allowed and agents are maxmin expected utility maximizers, we prove that all efficient allocations are implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242607

Chapter 17. Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility

Karni, Edi; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 901-947). 2015

This chapter reviews developments in the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty, focusing on models that … first part reviews models of decision making under risk that depart from the independence axiom, focusing on the rank …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025442

On the relation between robust and Bayesian decision making

Adam, Klaus - 2003

risk aversion and that decisions are insensitive (robust) to the precise assignment of prior probabilities. This holds …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765345

Accounting for different uncertainties : implications for climate investments?

Hector, Svenja - 2013

The paper clarifies the link between changes in risk aversion and the effect on the consumption discount rate. In a … rate to a change in risk aversion depends on some fundamental properties of the considered uncertainties. The application … of this general result to specific forms of uncertainty extends existing results to more general forms of risk and yields …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221085