In this paper, we present a model in which the performing arts are modelled as congestible public goods. In accordance with empirical evidence, the production of seat capacity is assumed to be subject to fixed costs. We estimate the parameters of the model's demand and cost functions using...

We report a controlled laboratory experiment examining risk-taking and information aggregation in groups facing a common risk. The experiment allows us to examine how subjects respond to new information, in the form of both privately observed signals and signals reported from others. We find...

We report an experiment examining risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Group members come to the table with an individual preference for a choice under risk, based on privately received information, and can share this information with fellow group members. They then make a decision...

This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion. A key result...

This paper investigates the role that idiosyncratic uncertainty plays in shaping social preferences over the degree of labor market flexibility, in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand where the productivity of firms evolves over time as a Geometric Brownian motion. A key result...

In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on his own. In...

In this article we address the problem of finding feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic differential games defined on descriptor systems. First, we decouple the dynamic and algebraic parts of a descriptor system using canonical projectors. We discuss the effects of feedback on the...

We test whether deviations from Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking contests can be explained by the slow convergence of payoff-based learning. We identify and eliminate two sources of noise that slow down learning. The first source of noise is present because each action is evaluated against a...

Two opposed parties seek to influence an uninformed decision maker. They invest in acquiringinformation and select what to disclose. The decision maker then adjudicates. We compare thisbenchmark with a procedure allowing adversarial cross-examination. A cross-examiner tests theopponent in order...

In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an...