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Lobbying, counterlobbying, and the structure of tariff protection in poor and rich countries

Cadot, Olivier; De Melo, Jaime; Olarreaga, Marcelo - In: The World Bank economic review 18 (2004) 3, pp. 345-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002532572

Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries

Cadot, Olivier - 2010

A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760850

Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries

Cadot, Olivier; De Melo, Jaime; Olarreaga, Marcelo - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012564063

Using preferences to promote LDC exports : a Canadian success story?

Anson, Jose - In: Journal of world trade : law, economic policy, public policy 43 (2009) 2, pp. 285-315

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015140358

Tariff reductions in the presence of foreign direct investment

Olarreaga, Marcelo - In: Review of international economics 4 (1996) 3, pp. 263-275

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001210498

OECD imports: diversification of suppliers and quality search

Cadot, Olivier; Carrère, Céline; Strauss-Kahn, Vanessa - In: Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv) 150 (2014) 1, pp. 1-24

We posit that OECD buyers are in a continuous search for best quality suppliers from developing countries. We build a simple model of adverse selection and quality screening which captures this feature. The model predicts that diversification happens by “bouts”, or temporary episodes, during...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010992930