Focusing on seven bilateral donors over a 25 year period, the paper answers 4 questions related to aid allocation practice. Questions one and two examine allocation differences between donors and time periods. Questions three and four relate to changes in poverty and policy selectivity. To...

There are genuine concerns that foreign aid may crowd out domestic tax revenue. In the short run this would have negative consequences for the recipient government's revenue, and over a longer period could corrode governance through breaking the social contract. In recent years, two papers have...

In this paper, we focus on the determinants of the relationship between aid and corruption. We propose a static principal-agent model where a donor faces the problem of giving aid to a recipient country in which the phenomenon of corruption is widely spread. We distinguish among two different...

We analyse the selectivity criteria used by institutional donors when they allocate funds to NGOs. A simple screening model predicts that donors who care more about efficiency will screen NGOs and concentrate their funding on those that operate accordingly while donors who care less about...

We propose a repeated moral hazard model with full commitment and limited punishment to study the problem of aid allocation in environments characterized by asymmetric information. The donor (principal) finances a three-period development program and the elite of the recipient country (agent),...