This paper explores the implications of introducing digital public and private monies (e.g. tokenized central bank digital currency [CBDC] or tokenized deposits) for stablecoins and illicit crypto transactions. When they pay a high interest rate and guarantee a high degree of anonymity, these...

This paper explores the implications of introducing digital public and private monies (e.g. tokenized central bank digital currency [CBDC] or tokenized deposits) for stablecoins and illicit crypto transactions. When they pay a high interest rate and guarantee a high degree of anonymity, these...

Why do BigTech platforms introduce payment services? Digital platforms often run business models where activities on the platform generate data that can be monetized off the platform. There is a trade-off between the value of such data and the privacy concerns of users, since platforms need to...

In this article, we use a simple stylized model of collateralized lending to analyze the value proposition and limitations of decentralized finance (DeFi). DeFi uses a decentralized ledger to run smart contracts that automatically enforce the terms of a lending contract and safeguard the...

We review the nascent but fast-growing literature on central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), focusing on their potential impacts on private banks. We evaluate these impacts in three areas of traditional banking: payments, lending, and liquidity and maturity transformation. For each area, we...

Decentralized finance (DeFi) is composed of a variety of heterogeneous sectors that are interconnected through an input-output network of its tokens. We first use a panel data set to empirically document the evolution of the DeFi network across its different sectors. Instead of looking at the...

We develop a dynamic model of decentralized finance (DeFi) lending that incorporates two/these key features: 1) borrowing and lending are decentralized, anonymous, overcollateralized and backed by the market value of crypto assets where contract terms are pre-specified and rigid; and 2)...

This paper builds a model with imperfect competition in the banking sector. In the model, banks issue deposits and make loans, and deposits can be used as payment instruments by households. We use the model to assess the general equilibrium effects of introducing a central bank digital currency...

How well can a cryptocurrency serve as a means of payment? Cryptocurrencies need to overcome double spending by using costly mining and by delaying settlement. We formalize this insight through an incentive constraint that rules out double spending and pins down the welfare costs of a...

Should a central bank digital currency (CBDC) be issued? Should its design be cash- or depositlike? To answer these questions, we theoretically and quantitatively assess the effects of a CBDC on consumption, banking and welfare. Our model introduces new general equilibrium linkages across...