Online marketplaces have adopted new quality control mechanisms that can accommodate a flexible pool of providers. In the context of ride-hailing, we measure the effectiveness of these mechanisms, which include ratings, incentives, and behavioral nudges. Using telemetry data as an objective...

This online appendix to "Insulated Platform Competition" includes proofs and details of our applications.The paper to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317" http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317

This appendix provides formal details to accompany the forthcoming article "Multidimensional Platform Design" in the 2017 American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings and available at: 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2891806' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2891806

Does competition promote efficient platform pricing and market structures? We model imperfect platform competition using a new approach, Insulated Equilibrium (IE). Building on the observation that platforms often charge low prices to build a "critical mass", IE assumes platforms use...

Successful platforms attract not just many users, but also those of the right kind. "The right kind of user" is one who can either be directly monetized or who differentially attracts other valuable users. Bonacich centrality on the network of user sorting with direct value of monetization...