This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other platform to convince customers that the two sides will...

We consider a methodology for studying how beliefs shape platform competition, based on the notion of a partial focality. The concept of focality is useful for modeling platform competition when the presence of network effects results in multiple equilibria for a certain set of prices. We...

Blockchain technologies are designed to promote decentralization and self-governance in economic and social settings. In the context of platforms, an early claim of some proponents of these technologies was that blockchains would promote disintermediation, replacing intermediaries with...

The development of Blockchains technologies, including smart contracts and cryptographic tokens, have a potential to change the competition between platforms. In this presentation, based on a couple of projects, I discuss how utility tokens can help new platforms enter the market, and how...

We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits – under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other side (users) to be uninformed about...

A major result in the study of two-sided platforms is the strategic interdependence between the two sides of the same platform, leading to the implication that a platform can maximize its total profits by subsidizing one of its sides. We show that this result largely depends on assuming that at...