Showing 1 - 10 of 56
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012006211
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870138
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026029
We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a major nationwide reform. The drastic 2003 “Gatekeeper Protocol” raised DI application costs and revealed more information about individual true ability to work....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012837754
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015074354
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409482
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002154846
Public schemes for sickness benefits and disability insurance are often criticized for the lack of incentive they provide for preventive and reintegration activities by employers. To stimulate the interest of employers in engaging with these schemes, several modes of privatization could be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571496
It has been well-documented that Disability Insurance (DI) may cause moral hazard in terms of higher disability risk and lower employment. For supplementary insurance from private insurers, however, the effects are less well understood: extra coverage may further increase workers' moral hazard,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077129
Workers with fixed-term contracts typically have worse health than workers with permanent contracts. We show that these differences in health translate into a substantially higher (30%) risk of applying for disability insurance (DI) in the Netherlands. Using unique administrative data on health...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083776