We study the no-arbitrage theory of voluntary disclosure (Dye, J Account Res 23:123–145, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">1985</CitationRef>, and Ostaszewski and Gietzmann, Rev Quant Financ Account 31: 1–27, <CitationRef CitationID="CR17">2008</CitationRef>), generalized to the setting of <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> firms, simultaneously and voluntarily, releasing at the interim-report date...</equationsource></inlineequation></citationref></citationref>

Shin (J Account Res 44(2):351–379, <CitationRef CitationID="CR42">2006</CitationRef>) has argued that in order to understand the equilibrium patterns of corporate disclosure, it is necessary for researchers to work within an asset pricing framework in which corporate disclosures are endogenously determined. Echoing this sentiment,...</citationref>