We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...

We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov perfect equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...

We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...

We consider identification of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using 'micro data,' i.e., observation of the characteristics and choices of individual consumers. Our model of preferences nests random coefficients discrete choice models widely used in practice with...

Empirical models of differentiated products demand (and often supply) are widely used in industrial organization and other fields of economics. We review some recent work studying identification in a broad class of such models. This work shows that the parametric functional forms and...

We consider identification of nonparametric random utility models of multinomial choice using "micro data," i.e., observation of the characteristics and choices of individual consumers. Our model of preferences nests random coefficients discrete choice models widely used in practice with...