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Robust trading mechanisms with budget surplus and partial trade

Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan - In: Economic theory bulletin 6 (2018) 2, pp. 201-208

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976216

A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing

Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan - In: Journal of mathematical economics 77 (2018), pp. 32-38

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105425

A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation

Schwartz, Jesse A.; Wen, Quan - Vanderbilt University Department of Economics - 2008

We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any PPD mechanism, every...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595883