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The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328463
The Conflict Analysis approach by Hipel and Fraser (1984) is well equipped to model repeated games. Players are assumed to posses a sequential reasoning that allows them to ( not necessarily correctly) anticipate the reaction of other players to their strategies. An individual's best response...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493836
A rational player will never play a strictly dominated strategy. It might be tempting therefore to eliminate such strategies from any subsequent analysis. However, if equilibrium selection is an issue it may be wrong to do so. In models of adaptive learning with state-independence mutations,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604857