In the framework of international cooperation on climate change to control greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), this paper aims to shed new light on the eventuality of the emergence of a country (or a group of countries) behaving as a leader in the implementation of its environmental policy. The...

This paper presents a generalized Stackelberg model of market leaderhip with noisy observation. The current prevailing Stackelberg model and Cournot market are two extreme cases of this generalized Stackelberg model. As the follower relies less on the inaccurate noisy observation and more on...

In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own...

We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homogeneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version, we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our...

This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models. Given the concavity and continuity of payoffs, I derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of SNE in these non-cooperative games

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...

We examine repeated Cournot oligopolies when there is uncertainty about the number of players. Already in the static game, such uncertainty can imply outputs above Nash. For the repeated game, we argue that the uncertainty may lead to a novel strategy, based on a notion of limited depth of...

In this paper, we fully characterize the Nash Equilibrium in the winner-take-all Bertrand Game, showing that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it is a zero operating profit one, and there exist at least two players whose bids are all unprofitable. Compared with...

We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy and then, taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure...