We examine vertical backward integration in a reducedform model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate...

This paper provides a simple unified discrete-choice framework for analyzing differentiated duopolies. This framework nests models of horizontal and vertical differentiation, including standard textbook models (Hotelling and Shaked-Sutton). Contrary to these models, it also applies to economic...

This paper provides a simple unified discrete-choice framework for analyzing differentiated duopolies. This framework nests models of horizontal and vertical differentiation, including standard textbook models (Hotelling and Shaked-Sutton). Contrary to these models, it also applies to economic...

This paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We...