In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...

Spatial quality choice is introduced, where consumers are horizontally differentiated by taste and firms vertically differentiated by quality location, within an equilibrium model of duopoly competition characterized by asymmetric fixed and variable costs. Firms choose quality location followed...

We examine the price decisions in a vertically differentiated duopoly where the decision to buy a good depends not only upon the intrinsic utility from consuming it but also upon the social attributes (prestige, uniqueness etc) associated with its consumption. These social attributes are...

This study constructs a consumer search model in which some consumers search for multiple products, whereas others search for a single product. A price difference arises because of a difference in the price elasticity for each group. We show that a positive demand shock to one of the products...

The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions, the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities

Portuguese Abstract: Exploramos vários jogos diferenciais para simular a competição entre duas firmas em Preço, Publicidade, e Preço e Publicidade simultâneamente. Os resultados reforçam conclusões importantes na literatura e complementam-na, permitindo analisar a competição em dois...

We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules....

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior...

In theory, partial cross-ownership affects product prices and consumer welfare negatively, but empirical evidence is highly controversial. For competition policy it is important whether such effects are substantial enough to cause action. We report a lab experiment on a homogeneous duopoly...

Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004; Hostmann et al., 2018). This result could be explained by a higher difficulty to coordinate or by lower incentives to collude in markets with more firms. We show that the Quantal...