The paper addresses the question of pricing access to the network facilities of an incumbent firm after deregulation. Network access pricing continues to be regulated in such industries as telecommunications, railroads, electric power and natural gas. We emphasize that access prices should be...

Empirical evidence suggests that many mergers do not increase profits of the participating firms and decrease welfare. Due to the globalization of markets we should take an international view on mergers and their welfare effects. This paper develops a Bertrand-model of an international...

We consider a dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. The incumbent platform enjoys a focal position such that consumers expect other consumers to join it, while the entrant platform may enjoy a quality advantage. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that...

Recovery of stranded costs is perhaps the most litigious issue encountering regulators in promoting competition in United States and European utility industries. We build a dynamic model of Cournot competition which takes into account a particular regulatory mechanism regularly employed in...

Theoretical models of spatial competition usually assume an uniform consumer distribution. In the real world, firms frequently compete for consumers who are not uniformly located. The equilibrium duopoly locations of several types of commonly used distributions were discussed in Meagher, Teo and...

Janssen and Rasmusen (2002) show that a Bertrand model with an uncertain number of firms has only one symmetric equilibrium, and profits in that equilibrium fit the empirical data in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). However, unless its equilibrium is unique, Janssen and Rasmusen's model cannot be...

This note is concerned with the effects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can...

This note is concerned with the e¤ects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can...

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...