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In this paper we use a dynamic structural life-cycle model to analyze the employment, fiscal and welfare effects induced by unemployment insurance. The model features a detailed specification of the tax and transfer system, including unemployment insurance benefits which depend on an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941763
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In this paper we use a dynamic structural life-cycle model to analyze the employment, fiscal and welfare effects induced by unemployment insurance. The model features a detailed specification of the tax and transfer system, including unemployment insurance benefits which depend on an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003945980
Untersucht wird der Einfluss des Humankapitals, der Arbeitsmarktlage, der familiären Situation sowie der Persönlichkeitseigenschaften und sozialen Ressourcen auf die individuelle Arbeitslosigkeitsdauer anhand des Sozioökonomischen Panels (SOEP) in West- und Ostdeutschland. Es wird eine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011438269
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013436288
Standard job search theory assumes that unemployed individuals have perfect information about the effect of their search effort on the job offer arrival rate. In this paper, we present an alternative model which assumes instead that each individual has a subjective belief about the impact of his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014194620
This paper assesses the dynamics of treatment effects arising from variation in the duration of training. We use German administrative data that have the extraordinary feature that the amount of treatment varies continuously from 10 days to 395 days (i.e. 13 months).This feature allows us to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220677
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341