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The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463482
The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157916
Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called buyers and sellers: In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067637
This paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053867
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003480425
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003712719
"The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003862277
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656832
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852696
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002531404