The present paper illustrates the coordination problem with a standard two-person non-cooperative gae, with yields two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one of which is Pareto dominated by the other.

The issue of the connection between correlated equilibria of Maskin-Tirole (1987) economies and finite markovian stationary sunspot equilibria of overlapping generations economies is reconsidered in this paper.

Under not-too-stringent assumptions this study shows that there exists a generic extensive-form game having no "strategically stable" equilibrium. In addition, it is suggested that careless invocation of "common belief assumption" may be a potential source of inconsistent beliefs for players.

In this paper we consider the spatial model by Anderson and Neven (1991) to study the subgame perfect equilibria without restricting the consumers' reservation price. New equilibria emerge where firms locate at disperse points in space. Also, at equilibrium, firms may monopolize some segments of...

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust against...

We model repeated play of noncooperative stage games in terms of approximate gradient steps. That simple format require little information and no optimization. Moreover, it allows players to evaluate marginal cost or profit inexactly and to move with different velocities. Uncertainty can also be...

We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points...

A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quas-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequency of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

We show for general class of market environments that there exist allocations that cannot be improved upon by allocations that are obtainable in the nash equilibrium of alternative noncooperative games. We take account of the fact that in such alternative games, individuals will draw inferences...