Showing 1 - 10 of 31
Modern Business cycle theory involves developing models that explain stylized facts. For this strategy to be success, these facts should be we established. In this paper, we focus on the stylized facts of international business cycles.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005133070
Multi-countru models have not been very successful in replicating features of the international transmission of business cycles. Standard models predict cross-country correlations of output and consumption which are respectively too low and loo high. In this paper, we built a multi-country model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353091
In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545586
We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sens that there exists a preference profil with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set core elements of the economy for any given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545592
In this paper, we provide both quantitative and quantitative measures of the cost of measuring the integrated volatility by the realized volatility when the frequency of observation is fixed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545599
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning K indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545610
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729527
In this paper, we develop finite-sample inference procedures for stationary and nonstationary autoregressive (AR) models.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729533
A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729546