We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero sum game over an infinite horizon: by introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game...

We modify the altruistic model by assuming that income, instead of the heir's utility, enters the altruist's utility function. We name this formulation "myopic" because, unlike in Barro's (1974) model, the altruist does not need to foresee into the indenite future to make his decisions. We...

This paper defines a decomposition of technical efficiency for a series of nonparametric deterministic reference technologies related to the Free Disposal Hull. More specificaally, introducing several returns to scale assumptions into this non-convex production model allows one to distinguish...

Williamson (1979) claims that in a buyer-seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and state of nature, the hold up of future benefits leads to underinvestment. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) resolve it provided that the initial contract can specify a default option...

This paper proposes a new kind of asymmetric GARCh where the conditional variance obeys two different regimes with a smooth transition function. In one formulation, the conditional variance reacts differently to negative and positive shocks while in a second formulation, small and big shocks...

based on Chari and Jagannathan (1988), this paper models information-induced and "pure-panic"runs in an environment of risk-aves agents. In this framework, deposits are needed to provide insurance against investors'unexpected demand for liquidity and therefore, a role for financial intermediary...

We analyze the problem of competitive mechanism design within the context of a model of product differentiated oligopoly. In an oligopoly setting, participation by an agent in any one firm's catalog is endogenously determined. This facts leads naturally to a modification of the classical notion...

In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we build social welfare functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information on individual preferences. Social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in...