Competition and market power have been the focus of much of the empirical research conducted by the EIM in the recent past. This report is concerned with these issues as well, and focuses in particular on the link between market conduct and performance. The background of the model which is...

This report discusses allocative efficiency and focuses on pricing and quantity-setting policies. These can be considered to be the most fundamental aspects of market power. Perfect competition is commonly advocated as optimal. If the price in a certain industry diverges from marginal cost, this...

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of several pricing rules intended to promote entry into a network industry dominated by an incumbent carrier. Drawing on the work of Cournot and Hotelling, we develop a model of competition between two interconnected networks.

This article analyses how the degree of product differentiation, the size of the cartel and the size of the industry affect the stability of a cartel formed by any number of firms in an industry of any size. The paper considers a supergame-theoretic model to define stability. After a non-loyal...

Hotelling's conceptual framework is expanded to incorporate the effects of a backstop technology on the planning horizon of the suppliers of an exhaustible resource and its price and quantity trajectories. It is shown that in the non-trivial case, the presence of a backstop technology shortens...

We find evidence that the law of one price (LOOP) holds more nearly for country pairs that are within geographic regions that for country pairs that are not.

We find evidence that the law of one price (LOOP) holds more nearly for country pairs that are within geographic regions that for country pairs that are not.

Exploring a variant of the model of Aghion and Bolton Yields the following results. When an incumbent seller is constrained to price linearly, an exclusionary vertical contract Pareto-dominates spot sales by smoothing prices across states of the world ( potential entrant does or does not appear).

We analyze the problem of competitive mechanism design within the context of a model of product differentiated oligopoly. In an oligopoly setting, participation by an agent in any one firm's catalog is endogenously determined. This facts leads naturally to a modification of the classical notion...

In this paper we have developed a model which analyzes price competition in the deregulated Spanish electricity market. This model is the first to take explicitly into account the mechanism designed in the recent Spanish Electricity Law for settling stranded costs payments.