In this paper we will describe a class of three-person games and draw general conclusions about non-cooperative behavior in them.

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sens that there exists a preference profil with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set core elements of the economy for any given...

In this paper, we provide both quantitative and quantitative measures of the cost of measuring the integrated volatility by the realized volatility when the frequency of observation is fixed.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning K indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and...

In this paper, we develop finite-sample inference procedures for stationary and nonstationary autoregressive (AR) models.

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of...

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or groups of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable...

This paper prouves a new representation theorem for domains with both discrete and continuous variables.