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We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions of the best reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four firms, the best reply process should theoretically explode if demand and cost functions are linear. We find, however, no experimental evidence of such instability....
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This paper considers the optimal choice of the numeraire for the curency conversion that will constitute the final step in the transition from EMS to EMU. At the moment it seems to be understood that the current basket-structured ECU will be chosen for this purpose. We argue that this choice is...
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The purpose of this paper is to present a numerical method to solve partial stochastic differential equations. This concept remains the differential operator unchanged but discretizes the dimension of the problem. The response function will be decomposed by the Karhunen--Loeve expansion and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032148
If calibrated to an observed term structure of interest rates that only covers a finite range of times-to-maturity an HJM-model of the term structure of interest rates will eventually die out in finite time as bonds reach maturity. This poses problems for the pricing and hedging of certain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032167
The paper developes a general arbitrage free model for the term structure of interest rates. The principal model is formulated in a discrete time structure. It differs substantially from the Ho--Lee-- Model (1986) and does not generate negative spot and forward rates. The results for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032172
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032173
We consider the model of social learning by Schlag (1996). Individuals must repeatedly choose an action in a multi-armed bandit. We assume that each indivdiual observes the outcomes of two other individuals' choices before her own next choice must be made -- the original model only allows for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032175