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Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect
Dijk, Justin; Ansink, Erik; Soest, Daniël Pieter van - 2018
decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
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Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven Heiko; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; … - 2014 - This version: November 5, 2014
We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433909
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Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i - 2017 - Revised Version of JERP 2014-027
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738563
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Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion : bribes, signals and selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro’i - 2014 - This version: November 20, 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
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Keeping out Trojan horses : auctions and bankruptcy in the laboratory
Onderstal, Sander; Veen, Ailko van der - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
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Collusion and the choice of auction : an experimental study
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2013
We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382492
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Cartel stability in experimental auctions
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander; Treuren, Leonard - 2019
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960510
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Keeping Out Trojan Horses : Auctions and Bankruptcy in the Laboratory
Onderstal, Sander - 2011
If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130292
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Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Ro’i Zultan - School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary - 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099055
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Auction mechanisms and bidder collusion: Bribes, signals and selection
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Zultan, Ro'i - 2014
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the … neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380984