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A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395646
-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise … reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608616
decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while … activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or … effects, the latter has the upper hand; average bids decrease monotonically over the consecutive auctions. Since repetition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932593
During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409963
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812
We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433909
In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers … eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first- over second-price auctions. With a high leak probability, second-price auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738563
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697250
Antitrust exemptions granted to businesses under extenuating circumstances are often justified by the argument that they benefit the public by helping producers adjust to otherwise difficult economic circumstances. Such exemptions may allow firms to coordinate their capacities, as was the case...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008805393
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost … suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the … collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278155