We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

In strictly competitive games, equilibrium mixed strategies are invariant to changes in the ultimate prizes. Dixit & Skeath (1999) argue that this seems counter-intuitive. We show that this invariance is robust to dropping the independence axiom, but is removed if we drop the reduction axiom.

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionary literature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simple behavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.

In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case. It consists of...

This paper analyzes the rationality of Japanese macroeconomic forecasters. It finds that Japanese individual forecasters are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in recession, and that they over-react to new information. Across forecasters, the magnitude of average forecast revisions is not...

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by strategies of other individuals: the elementary acts of other individuals at each state fo the world. At a Nash game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...

This paper studies relationships between the local determinacy of a stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight dynamics, and its local stability in dynamics arising from econometric learning procedures. There is no clear links in linear scalar economieds where agents forecast only one...