In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case. It consists of...

This paper analyzes the rationality of Japanese macroeconomic forecasters. It finds that Japanese individual forecasters are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in recession, and that they over-react to new information. Across forecasters, the magnitude of average forecast revisions is not...

In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their information with the information revealed by strategies of other individuals: the elementary acts of other individuals at each state fo the world. At a Nash game with rational expectations, the information of individuals is...

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

This paper studies relationships between the local determinacy of a stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight dynamics, and its local stability in dynamics arising from econometric learning procedures. There is no clear links in linear scalar economieds where agents forecast only one...

This paper analyzes the rationality of Japanese macroeconomic forecasters. It finds that Japanese individual forecasters are pessimistic in boom and optimistic in recession, and that they over-react to new information. Across forecasters, the magnitude of average forecast revisions is not...

We explore the role of expectations in second generation currency crisis models, proving that sudden shifts in speculators' beliefs can trigger currency devaluations, even without any sizable worsening in the fundamentals. In our incomplete information game, mean-preserving changes in...