The possibility of using revenues from environmental taxes to reduce other distortions in the tax system has been much discussed recently. This paper reviews the current debate and presents empirical evidence to suggest that the double dividend approach to CO2 emissions control in Canada can...

This paper considers environments in which several agents (countries, farmers, cities) share water from a river. Each agent enjoys a concave benefit function from consuming water up to a satiation level. Noncooperative extraction is typically inefficient and any group of agents can gain if they...

The possibility of using revenues from environmental taxes to reduce other distortions in the tax system has been much discussed recently. This paper reviews the current debate and presents empirical evidence to suggest that the double dividend approach to CO2 emissions control in Canada can...

Policy makers in Europe have become increasingly aware of the need to curb the adverse effects of transport externalities, in particular the impact of cars on the environment. In some countries of the European Union, economic instruments have been used to reduce emissions generated by passenger...

Policy makers in Europe have become increasingly aware of the need to curb the adverse effects of transport externalities, in particular the impact of cars on the environment. In some countries of the European Union, economic instruments have been used to reduce emissions generated by passenger...

It is shown that when some countries take unilateral steps towards solving environmental problems, efficiency in the global economy will be enhanced by implementing trade provisions along with domestic environmental regulations.

The authors construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. The authors analyze...

In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter-regional transfers and redistributive policies non-cooperatively.