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Violator avoidance and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement

Innes, Robert D. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 17 (2001) 1, pp. 239-256

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001582757

Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation

Innes, Robert D. - In: International review of law and economics 24 (2004) 1, pp. 29-48

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002168370

Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement when violators have heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension

Innes, Robert D. - In: The journal of legal studies 29 (2000) 1,1, pp. 287-300

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001471869

Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement

Innes, Robert D. - In: Journal of regulatory economics 52 (2017) 2, pp. 107-131

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011783586

Self-reporting and optimal law enforcement when there are remediation benefits, penalty assessment costs, and heterogeneity in the likelihood of violators' apprehension

Innes, Robert D. - In: Papers in efficiency, effectiveness and international …, (pp. 195-223). 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001498853

Fines, Appeals and Liability in Public Enforcement with Stochastic Damage and Asymmetric Information

Innes, Robert D. - 2004

This paper studies an enforcement game between a regulator and firms that can cause harmful accidents. The distribution of potential accident damage is private information to the firms, and realized damage can be observed only at the cost of going to court. Under conditions described in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070856