In a world with risk-neutral agents, liability rules will only induce efficient behaviour if these rules impose the full (marginal) costs of an action on the parties. However, institutional restrictions or bilateral activity choices can prevent the full internalisation of costs. A mechanism is...

In a world with risk-neutral agents, liability rules will only induce efficient behaviour if these rules impose the full (marginal) costs of an action on the parties. However, institutional restrictions or bilateral activity choices can prevent the full internalisation of costs. A mechanism is...

Preliminary -- Introduction -- The Economics of Tort Law:Basics and Selected Core Themes -- On the Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law -- On the Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability -- Screening Accident Victims -- A Note on Judgment Proofness and Risk...

In a world with risk-neutral agents, liability rules will only induce efficient behavior if these rules impose the full (marginal) costs of an action on the parties. However, institutional restrictions or bilateral activity choices can prevent the full internalization of costs. A mechanism is...

In a world with risk-neutral agents in which accidents occur with a positive probability, liability rules will only induce efficient behaviour if these rules impose the full (marginal) costs of an action on the parties. However, institutional restrictions or bilateral activity choices can...