Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. Design/methodology/approach – The analysis is based on a simple model of growth in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. Design/methodology/approach – The analysis is based on a simple model of growth in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to...

In an overlapping generations economy, lenders fund risky investment projects of firms by drawing up loan contracts in the presence of an informational asymmetry. An optimal contract entails the issue of only debt, only equity, or a mix of the two. The equilibrium choice of contract depends on...

This paper presents an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. The analysis is based on a simple neo-classical growth model in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to collect taxes from households. Corruption is reflected in...